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The use of electronic money transfer through cellular networks (\mobile money") is rapidly increasing in
the developing world. The resulting electronic currency ecosystem could improve the lives of the estimated
2 billion people who live on less than $2 a day by facilitating more secure, accessible, and reliable ways to
store and transfer money than are currently available. The development of this ecosystem requires a network
of agents to conduct cash-for-electronic value transactions and vice versa. This paper estimates the eect of
competition and service quality on mobile money demand. In this setting, service quality consists of service
reliability (lower stockout and system downtime rates), pricing transparency, and agent expertise. Among
our results, we nd that agents experience reduced demand for service failures due to stockouts, but not
for service failures due to network downtime, suggesting that consumers dierentially ascribe responsibility
for service failure based on the type of failure they experience. We nd that both stockout rate and agent
expertise are important competitive dimensions in this setting. Pricing transparency, on the other hand, has
a main eect on demand but has no signicant interaction with competitive intensity. This paper furthers our
understanding of the impact and interaction of quality and competition in service settings, while developing
a foundation for the exploration of mobile money by OM scholars.
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1. Introduction
In the past 7 years, \mobile money" platforms have experienced explosive growth in the developing
world, now with 219 active mobile money systems in 84 countries (Groupe Speciale Mobile Asso-
ciation 2013). These platforms, primarily built and managed by mobile network operators, allow
money to be stored in the form of digital currency (hereafter referred to as e-oat). In much the
same way that text messages can be sent quickly and cheaply, e-oat can be securely and instantly
transferred across long distances at a near-zero marginal transaction cost. Mobile money platforms
are of particular interest to the base of the pyramid (BoP) community|scholars and practitioners
developing business models deliberately geared toward serving the population in poverty|because
they have potential to connect millions of poor and \unbanked" people to the formal nancial
system. This has potential to provide several benets: i) it can enable quicker recovery from eco-
nomic shocks such as job loss or illness to the primary wage-earner (Jack and Suri 2014); ii) it can
1Balasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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enable more ecient receipt of monetary transfers from non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
after disasters (Aker et al. 2011); and iii) it can lay the foundation for access to formal savings,
credit, and insurance opportunities to those who currently lack such access (Mas 2010).
A highly reliable network of cash-in/cash-out (CICO) agents to serve as the bridge between
physical cash and e-oat is critical to the success of mobile money platforms. These agents, often
small shop-owners, convert cash to e-oat (\cash-in" transactions) and e-oat back to cash (\cash-
out" transactions) for a commission. Because these agents ensure the convenient convertibility of
e-oat, the reliability with which they perform such transactions is crucial to consumer condence
in the platforms. However, due to stockouts of cash or e-oat, agents are often unable to satisfy
consumer demand for CICO services|i.e., an agent's fundamental challenge in managing their
CICO business is an inventory problem. Consequently, operations management scholars have a role
to play in the development of robust mobile money ecosystems.
The contract and inventory theory tools developed over the past decades can apply to this
fundamentally new context, but as community, we must rst develop an understanding of the
mobile money business, particularly the nature of demand. Accordingly, we seek to provide an
introduction to mobile money and explore the eects of competition and service quality on that
demand. Specically, we explore two overarching questions: what is the main eect of an agent's
service quality on their steady-state demand, and what is the eect of competitive intensity? With
respect to the rst question, we are interested in three dimensions of service quality pertinent
in this context: i) service reliability (i.e., lower stockout and system downtime rates); ii) pricing
transparency (related to agent credibility); and iii) agent expertise (related to agent competence).
With respect to the second question, we are interested in both the main eect of competitive
intensity and in understanding how competitive intensity moderates the eect of these dimensions
of service quality on demand.
To answer these questions, we use a combination of agent network and demographic data sources
from Kenya and Uganda, two East African countries at dierent stages of mobile money market
development. We utilize an in-person survey of over 4,400 mobile money agents that operate in
the two countries. We then combine the locations of the surveyed agents with the precise locations
of over 68,000 bank branches, bus stands, and mobile money agents, as well as population and
poverty estimates for each square kilometer of the countries. We nd that an agent's reduction in
steady-state demand for stocking out of cash or e-oat is economically and statistically signicant.
However, agents do not experience decreased demand when they are unable to fulll demand due
to a system outage. Mobile money consumers, therefore, appear to dierentially ascribe trans-
action failure ownership, and agents are aected accordingly. Agents who are more transparent
with transaction pricing and agents who are more knowledgeable experience relatively greaterBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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demand. Agents' pricing transparency does not interact with competitive intensity. Agents that
provide more reliable and more knowledgeable service, on the other hand, reap greater rewards
from their performance in the face of greater competition. This can be related to Hill's (1993)
operations strategy framework of \order-qualiers" and \order-winners": pricing transparency acts
as an \order-qualier" among a portion of the consumer-base, while reliability and expertise are
\order-winners" as dimensions along which agents compete.
2. Literature review
Our work relates to literature focused on inventory service level, service quality, competition, and
operations at the base of the pyramid (BoP).
In inventory management, there are two broad classes of mismatch costs: i) holding and spoilage
costs incurred by carrying too much inventory; and ii) stockout costs, which are opportunity costs
incurred by carrying too little inventory. With our focus on steady-state demand eects, we are
interested in the latter. There are two primary components to stockout cost: the immediate cost
and the future cost. In its basic form, the immediate cost is relatively simple to calculate: it can be
computed directly as the dierence between the margin of the out-of-stock good and the expected
value of the recoverable margin (which is the product of margin, the likelihood of the customer
returning for the same good, and any applicable discount factor). Using survey data from Ohio
liquor store customers, Walter and Grabner (1975) measure this immediate cost, and also account
for substituting the stocked-out product for a similar product of a dierent brand or size. The loss
of future demand due to stockouts can be more dicult to estimate. Schwartz (1966) coined the
term \perturbed demand" in his seminal work modeling the loss of consumer goodwill that a rm
experiences in the aftermath of a stockout. \Perturbed demand" refers to the decrease in future
demand, where this decrease is a function of the magnitude of the stockout. Anderson et al. (2006)
empirically estimate the short and long-run costs of stockouts for a mail order catalog, nding
these costs to be both statistically and economically signicant. However, Anderson et al. (2006)
do not account for competition among rms, nor do they account for geographic variation in the
rm's customer base (such as population density and socio-economic status) as we do. Using a
branded apparel context, Craig et al. (2014) study supplier- retailer relationships. They nd that
higher supplier service levels have a large eect on suppliers' demand from retailers when supplier
service levels are already high: a 1% increase in historical supplier service level is associated with
a 13% increase in demand from retailers.
Service quality has attracted interest in the past three decades. While quality has a plethora of
denitions (Reeves and Bednar 1994), we focus on three widely-recognized dimensions of service
quality: reliability, credibility, and competence (Parasuraman and Zeithaml 1988). In the mobileBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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money context, reliability (service failure) is measured through stockout and system downtime
rates. We measure credibility and competence, respectively, through each agent's pricing trans-
parency and their expertise with respect to transaction policies and procedures. With respect to
service failures, Taylor (1994) studies the attribution of blame for service failures in the context of
airline delays and nds that attribution is associated with the perception of rm control over the
delay (e.g. travelers are less likely to blame an airline for delays due to inclement weather than for
mechanical failures). Taylor (1994) studies attribution of blame with an attitudinal questionnaire,
while we study a more tangible quantity of interest: demand impacts.
While (to the best of our knowledge) there are no empirical studies that directly explore the eect
of pricing transparency and a provider's expertise on demand, the framework of trust developed
in the literature is relevant. A generally accepted conceptualization of trust is two-dimensional:
trust is composed of \benevolence trust" and \competence trust" (Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000).
Benevolence trust (the faith customers have in rms not to cheat them) is related to our measure
of credibility (i.e., pricing transparency) and competence trust (the faith customers have in rms
to be able to competently fulll demand) is related to agent expertise. Both of these concepts and
their applications are discussed further in Section 4 where we develop our hypotheses.
In addition to literature exploring inventory management and service quality, there has also
been interest in the eect of competition on inventory decisions and service quality. Olivares and
Cachon (2009) argue that the theory on this question is mixed. On one hand, higher competition
will drive down price, predicting a lower optimal inventory service level. On the other hand, higher
competition will force rms to compete on service level, driving service level up. In the context of the
US auto market, Olivares and Cachon (2009) nd that greater competition among dealers results
in higher service levels. Allon et al. (2011) develop a structural estimation model to quantify the
impact of wait time (as opposed to inventory stockout rate, pricing transparency, and transaction
expertise) on consumer demand in the US fast-food industry. Our work diers markedly from these
contributions. First, the context is vastly dierent{rather than estimating the impact of service
level in the US auto or fast-food sector, we focus on a nancial service in the developing world.
Secondly, because we have estimates of sales from agents, we do not need to impute them through
the use of a structural model, as Allon et al. (2011) do. Thirdly, to the best of our knowledge, we
are the rst to empirically study how the reduction in demand related to stockouts varies with the
level of competitive intensity that rms (agents, in our context) face.
Finally, because mobile money has potential to dramatically lower the cost structure of serving
the poor with nancial services, mobile money is fundamentally related to the emerging literature
on serving the BoP (Prahalad and Hammond 2002). Research in the operations management
community focused on BoP is quite nascent (e.g., Sodhi and Tang 2011; Gold et al. 2013). Our
work here contributes to this emerging stream.Balasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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3. Context
In this section, we provide an overview of mobile money's history, impact, and implications. We
also describe the mechanics of a mobile money transaction, as well as challenges and opportunities
confronting mobile money systems.
3.1. Mobile money motivation and history
The poor comprise the vast majority of the \unbanked", the nearly 2.5 billion people globally who
do not have an account at a formal nancial institution (Demirguc-kunt and Klapper 2012). The
poor and unbanked|roughly one-third of the world's population|rely mostly on physical cash
when transferring money. Thus, the velocity of money is limited by how fast cash can be physically
transported, by foot or by bus in most circumstances (Batista and Vicente 2013). This limitation
is a critical disadvantage to the poor when money is needed most, such as in the aftermath of a
negative economic shock (e.g., sickness or job loss) or a rare opportunity to climb out of poverty
through investment (e.g., fertilizer or improved seed purchases) (Helms 2006). At these decisive
moments, friends and family willing and able to transfer money must rely on expensive and/or
unreliable methods such as bus money transfer services (Morawczynski 2009). Furthermore, saving
for these pivotal moments is more challenging with inferior savings tools: to store and save money,
most either hide cash in their homes (at risk of theft and ineligible for interest), or purchase
relatively illiquid assets like gold or livestock (that are often sold at a loss in times of need) (Collins
et al. 2009). One study found that among a large sample of the poor in Uganda, 75% had lost some
portion of their cash or physical asset savings in the previous year (Wright and Mutesasira 2001).
Similarly, informal credit for investment opportunities and insurance options for risk mitigation
are substandard among the unbanked; credit is often only available from moneylenders at usurious
rates, and formal insurance is generally inaccessible, if it exists at all (Collins et al. 2009). The
poor, especially those living in rural areas, remain unserved by formal nancial institutions because
their low balances and transaction sizes yield little revenue for banks (Mas 2010). Furthermore,
because the rural poor live in denitionally low density and remote areas, these regions lack the
scale to make the provision of traditional nancial services an attractive proposition. Consequently,
nancial institutions have largely found it impractical to protably serve the poor in the developing
world (Kendall 2011).
The rapid growth of cellular networks in the developing world in the past decade lays the
groundwork for a potential paradigm shift in nancial services for the poor. According to the Boston
Consulting Group (BCG), the number of unbanked in the developing world with access to mobile
phones was estimated to be 2 billion in 2011, and that number is likely to continue to grow (BCG
2011). Recognizing this opportunity in 2003, the UK Department for International DevelopmentBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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approached Vodafone and its Kenyan aliate, Safaricom, about developing and piloting a new
service in Kenya that would allow micro-credit institutions to disburse loans and receive repayments
electronically. After the pilot project, Safaricom noticed that many people were using the service
to repay the loans of others (generally as a means of settling a secondary transactional obligation).
Safaricom quickly realized the potential of its service as a tool for domestic money transfer. They
branded the product \M-Pesa" (\Pesa" means \money" in Swahili) and launched the service in
March of 2007 (Buku and Meredith 2013). The uptake was rapid - in less than ve years, M-Pesa
amassed over 12 million customers from among Kenya's population of 45 million (Figure 1 depicts
M-Pesa's growth). Several years later, neighboring Uganda also experienced rapid growth in mobile
money adoption.
M-Pesa continues to dominate the mobile money market in Kenya, with nearly 70% market share
as of 2013. Its closest competitor is Airtel Kenya, with less than 20% market share. The industry is
even more consolidated in Uganda, where MTN Uganda has over 80% of the active mobile money
accounts in the country, while its closest competitor, Airtel Uganda, has only 10% of the country's
active mobile money accounts (Intermedia 2013). Due to each country's central bank regulations
restricting international remittances, mobile money operators in East Africa are limited to serving
customers in a single country.
Figure 1 Growth of M-Pesa customers and agents in Kenya, adapted from Jack and Suri (2014)
3.2. Transaction mechanics and inventory challenges
As M-Pesa's tagline, \send money home", would suggest, the use of mobile money to remit money
to a family member or friend from an urban area to a rural area grew quickly. The following isBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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a very typical use case: An urban laborer in Nairobi, Kenya gets paid in cash. He conducts a
cash-in transaction with an urban agent in which he gives the agent cash and the agent credits
the laborer's mobile money account with e-oat (Stage 1 in Figure 2). For her role in executing
the transaction, the agent receives a cash-in commission from the mobile money operator (e.g.,
Safaricom). (Notably, customers do not pay for cash-in transactions in any currently active mobile
money network.) The laborer, now with a balance of mobile money, sends this e-oat to his family
outside of Kisumu, Kenya with his phone (not necessarily a smartphone), in much the same way he
might send an SMS message (Stage 2 in Figure 2). The operator collects a fee from the laborer for
executing this person-to-person (P2P) transfer. Having instantaneously received the e-oat onto
her phone, the laborer's wife goes to the local agent outside of Kisumu to conduct a cash-out
transaction. She gives the agent e-oat in exchange for cash (Stage 3 in Figure 2), paying the mobile
money operator a cash-out fee. Like the cash-in agent, the cash-out agent is also compensated with
a commission from the operator for her role in executing the transaction.1
Figure 2 Schematic of a typical urban-to-rural person-to-person transfer, adapted from Agrawal (2009)
In order to conduct a cash-in or cash-out transaction, the agent must have inventory of e-oat
or cash, respectively. Unfortunately, stockouts are an acute problem in mobile money networks. In
rural areas, agents often run out of cash. Our data show that even in urban settings, service levels
can fall well below 80% for cash-out transactions. Agents also run out of e-oat, but to a lesser
1 Cash-out commissions are generally larger than cash-in commissions, typically by 50% or more. These commissions
are generally determined as an increasing step function of transaction value.Balasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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degree (Intermedia 2013). Because stockouts of cash and e-oat make it harder for customers to
easily convert between the two forms of money, they degrade consumer condence in the convenient
convertibility of e-oat.
When an agent stocks out of cash, the customer desiring to cash-out has two options: she can
return to the same agent later with the hope that the agent has replenished his inventory of cash;
or, she can travel to a dierent agent within the same operator network to cash-out (assuming
that this second agent has cash available). When the customer desiring to cash-in experiences a
stockout of e-oat, the customer has the above two options, as well as a third option: to travel to
an agent serving a dierent operator, assuming that the person he is sending money to also has
an account with the competing operator. Note that because e-oat is actual currency, it cannot be
\created" on the spot by either the agent or the operator. Each unit of e-oat an operator issues
must be backed by traditional deposits at a prudentially regulated nancial institution. Though
moving e-oat once it has been issued is clearly easier than moving cash, agents can still stock out
of e-oat if they have not been able to procure enough e-oat to satisfy demand.
4. Hypothesis development
Here we develop hypotheses related to service quality|in terms of service reliability, pricing trans-
parency, and expertise|and competitive intensity, including its interaction with service quality.
4.1. Service reliability
We measure service reliability by its inverse: service failure. There are two possible sources of CICO
agent service failure|the agent may be out of inventory, or the system may be down. Under either
form of service failure, the customer arrives to the agent, requests the transaction, and then receives
news that their transaction cannot be completed. Although the end result is the same under both
forms of service failure, we posit that the eect of these failures on agents dier by failure type.
The eect of stockouts on demand has been researched in other contexts. Schwartz (1966) the-
orizes in his perturbed demand model that customers will decrease their patronage of rms that
disappoint them by stocking out of desired products. Anderson et al. (2006) show that customers
who experienced stockouts do indeed purchase less in the future. We expect to see an analogous
\stockout eect" in the mobile money context; stockouts of cash and e-oat likely result in a
reduction of steady-state demand for CICO transactions.
Just as stockouts eectively deny customers the ability to carry out their desired transaction
with an agent, so too will system failure. On an agent level, do customers react dierently to system
failures than they do for stockouts even though the outcome, a denied transaction, is fundamentally
the same? Anderson et al. (2006) nd that there is no meaningful dierence in future customer
purchasing behavior between customers experiencing a stockout who were told \this item is out ofBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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stock" versus customers experiencing a stockout who were informed \this item is out of stock due to
a problem with a supplier." Therefore, the ndings of Anderson et al. (2006) imply that customers
might reduce their patronage of agents in response to supplier failures, which in this case would be
operator failures. However, in the mobile money context, an agent can demonstrate to customers
that the system is down by showing the system error message on her phone to the customer; this
eectively absolves the agent of blame for the denied transaction. Even though stockouts may also
be out of the agent's control (e.g., there may be systemic cash or e-oat shortages), the customer
cannot with certainty absolve agents of blame for stocking out. In an airline setting, Taylor (1994)
shows that consumer attribution of blame is associated with the degree to which consumers perceive
the rm is in control of the service failure. Therefore, we posit that consumers will be less likely
to attribute blame to the agent for system failures than for stockouts. We therefore expect the
reduction of demand associated with system failures, which we term the \system-down eect", to
be less severe than the loss of demand associated with stockouts.
Hypothesis 1. A) The higher the fraction of total demand that is unmet due to agent stockouts,
the lower the agent's steady-state demand. B) The reduction in demand associated with system
failures is less severe than for stockouts.
4.2. Pricing transparency and agent expertise
We posit that agent pricing transparency and agent expertise, two additional factors of service
quality, are also important inuencers of demand. In this case, both of these quality elements can
be examined through a customer trust lens. As we mention previously, a generally accepted concep-
tualization of trust is two-dimensional: trust is composed of \benevolence trust" and \competence
trust" (Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000).
Benevolence trust is commonly dened as the \perceived willingness of the trustee to behave
in a way that benets the interests of both parties, with a genuine concern for the partner, even
at the expense of prot" (Garbarino and Lee 2003). Posting of CICO pricing is both mandated
by operators and expected by consumers. The absence of pricing transparency may serve as a
warning sign to customers and therefore may degrade benevolence trust. This relates to emerg-
ing \disclosure" literature. The key dierence is that, in the disclosure literature, the established
norm is non-transparency|organizations have the decision whether or not to reveal traditionally
unobservable information such as their environmental performance (e.g., Toel and Reid 2009;
Kalkanci and Plambeck 2012), corporate social responsibility (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Gamer-
schlag et al. 2010), or operational processes (e.g., Buell and Norton 2011). In our setting, however,
the established norm with respect to pricing is one of transparency|operators mandate that theBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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tari be posted, and the majority (92%) of agents comply with this mandate. We posit that vio-
lating the established transparency norm erodes benevolence trust and that non-compliance (i.e.,
non-transparency) will therefore attenuate demand.
The second component of trust, competence trust, is generally dened as the perceived ability
of the rm to deliver services reliably and without aws (Garbarino and Lee 2003). A customer
has competence trust in an agent if the customer believes that the agent has the knowledge and
ability to properly conduct CICO transactions (e.g., the agent knows the correct daily transaction
limits, identication requirements, and other operator policies regarding the use of mobile money).
Though expertise cannot be observed as easily as pricing transparency (presence of a posted tari
sheet), agent expertise (or lack thereof) can be assessed by customers if guidance from agents is
either conrmed or discovered to be incorrect. Perceptions of expertise can also be shaped by the
opinions and experiences of those in the customer's social network. Greater expertise would thus
naturally lead to greater competence trust.
Sun and Lin (2010) nd that department store benevolence trust and competence trust both
increase customer loyalty (measured on a scale that includes future repeat purchase intent). Because
transparency likely engenders benevolence trust in agents, and expertise likely engenders compe-
tence trust in agents, we posit the presence of a \transparency eect" and an \expertise eect":
customers reward agents for pricing transparency and expertise, respectively, with higher demand.
Hypothesis 2. A) Customers reward agents for pricing transparency; steady-state demand
increases with pricing transparency. B) Customers reward agents for expertise; steady-state demand
increases with agent expertise.
4.3. Competition
Intuition suggests that in most settings competitive intensity would attenuate demand, as con-
sumers have a choice between a rm and its competitor(s). Indeed, in their study of auto dealerships,
Olivares and Cachon (2009) label this the \sales eect": increased competition decreases a dealer's
sales. We posit that this eect is present in the mobile money context as well: increasing competi-
tive intensity (increasing the number of proximate competitors) decreases each agent's steady-state
demand.
Furthermore, with product dierentiation and price (standardized by operators) o the table
as competitive dimensions, we posit that service quality provides a primary basis for competitive
dierentiation among agents. Specically, we hypothesize that the interaction of stockouts with
competitive intensity is negative; i.e., reduction in demand associated with stockouts is more severe
when competitive intensity is greater. Given proximate alternatives to an agent who stocks outBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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often, customers will likely exercise the option to use these alternatives. This relates to an observa-
tion by Olivares and Cachon (2009), who notice that service level increases with competition and
speculate that this is because retailers intuit that customers will be able to defect relatively easily
in response to low service levels{customers can simply go to a proximate competitor oering an
identical product.
Analogously, we posit that agents who engender benevolence trust by being more transparent
will be able to attract demand away from agents who do not engender such trust. We therefore
hypothesize that the interaction between competitive intensity and pricing transparency is positive
(i.e., the rewards for transparency increase with competitive intensity).
Similarly, we posit that agents who engender greater competence trust by demonstrating exper-
tise will be able to attract demand away from agents who do not. As with pricing transparency,
we hypothesize that the interaction between competitive intensity and expertise is positive (i.e.,
the rewards for expertise increase with competitive intensity).
Hypothesis 3. A) Agent demand decreases in competitive intensity. B) Competitive intensity
exacerbates the reduction in demand related to stockouts. C) Competitive intensity increases rewards
from pricing transparency. D) Competitive intensity increases the rewards from expertise.
5. Data and empirical specication
To test these hypotheses, we combine three data sources, each sampling Kenya and Uganda. First,
we utilize data from an in-person, cross-sectional survey of over 4,400 mobile money agents. We
combine this data with the precise locations of over 68,000 nancial access and transportation
points (including mobile money agents, banks, and bus stands) in the two countries. Finally, we
integrate granular (per square kilometer) spatial estimates of population and poverty (with the
latter dened as the number of people living on less than $2 per day) in each given square kilometer.
5.1. Agent network survey
We use a large survey conducted by MicroSave, an organization focused on extending nancial ser-
vices to the poor in the developing world. MicroSave's Agent Network Accelerator (ANA) survey
was conducted in Kenya and Uganda throughout 2013. Between 1,500 and 2,500 mobile money
agents were surveyed in-person in each country by a team of professional surveyors. The surveys
were designed to be nationally representative through three steps. First, the total number of agents
to be surveyed within a given country was determined based on time and nancial constraints.
Next, surveys were apportioned to each operator in each district (analogous to a county in the
United States) by multiplying the ratio of district population to national population by the opera-
tor's national customer base. Finally, in each district, a local team lead identied a representativeBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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enumeration area (EA). Once the EA was identied, surveyors were given mutually exclusive routes
to walk, applying a \left-hand-rule" walk pattern, skipping a pre-determined number of agents
on the left-hand side before attempting to interview the next agent.2 This pre-determined num-
ber was based on the number of agents the given operator had in the district, which was derived
from the spatial census data described below. Each survey lasted between 30-60 minutes, vary-
ing due to interruptions by customers during the survey administration. As with many in-person
surveys, there was a very high response rate (roughly 95%). All data were point estimates of
steady-state levels and were self-reported by the agents or observed directly by the surveyor. The
interview covered a wide array of topics, including demographics and location (latitude and lon-
gitude), products and services oered, inventory management, revenue and commission structure,
platform performance, training, monitoring, and support. From these data we glean independent
variables StockoutRatio, SystemDownRatio, PricingTransparency, and Expertise, as well as
controls Male, Tills, TillsRoot, Sunday, Dedicated, and OperatorG. Each of these variables is
described in detail in the econometric specication subsection. From the 4,406 survey responses,
we obtain our nal cross-sectional survey dataset of 3,580 observations by dropping observations
with missing values of the control variable Sunday (196), missing demand estimates (337), refusals
to provide demand estimates (265), and obviously skewed estimates of SystemDown (28). The
obviously skewed estimates of SystemDown were estimates of 100 or more lost transactions per
day, on average, from system failure. These dropped observations represented the top 0.17% of all
SystemDown data points, and were over 5 standard deviations greater than the mean (13). We
test (and nd support for) the robustness of our results to the inclusion of these dropped records
through multiple imputation. We discuss and provide the results of this robustness test in Section 6
and the Appendix.
5.2. Spatial census of nancial access points
We utilize data from fspmaps.com, a nancial access mapping eort funded by the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation (BMGF). In 2012 and 2013, Brand Fusion, a research company based in South
Africa, employed teams in Kenya and Uganda to collect geographic data. These teams canvassed
both countries for nancial service access points, recording their locations with GPS-enabled smart-
phones. The raw data behind fspmaps.com consists of the exact latitude and longitude coordi-
nates of over 68,000 mobile money agents (with operator details), bank branches, and bus stands
in Kenya and Uganda. Table 1 shows the collected geographic data breakdown by access-point-
type and country. The teams also supplemented every geographic data point with pictures of the
2 The \left (right)-hand-rule" is a common methodology for selecting stationary interviewees for in-person data
collection.Balasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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nancial access point for validation. By combining the surveyed agent locations with the spatial
census data through a process known as buer analysis, we generate the independent variable
DirectCompetition, as well as controls IndirectCompetition, Bank1km, and Bus1km.
Kenya Uganda Total
Mobile money agents 48,524 17,889 66,413
Bank branches 1,221 477 1,698
Bus stands 613 121 734
Table 1 Table of geotagged nancial access points
5.3. High-resolution spatial demographics
Lastly, we draw upon spatial population and income data generated by WorldPop, an organization
focused on creating high-quality maps for the humanitarian sector. In order to create these maps,
WorldPop combines three sources of data: satellite imagery (Radarsat-1 country mosaics and Land-
sat Enhanced Thematic Maps); the Africover database containing geographic data on roads, land
cover, and bodies of water; and country-level census data. The resulting integrated model generates
precise population estimates for every square kilometer of Africa (Tatem et al. 2007). WorldPop
used a similar method to develop a high-resolution spatial data layer of the population in poverty|
those consuming less than $2 per day. To generate its poverty spatial data, WorldPop employs a
process known as \Bayesian geostatistics" to integrate geocoded well-being surveys conducted by
USAID (Demographic and Health Survey) and the World Bank (Living Standards Measurement
Survey). The resulting data layer, like the general WorldPop data layer, has a resolution of 1 square
kilometer (Tatem 2013). Figure 3 depicts a spatial data layer of the poor population in Kenya's
Nyanza Province. The green circles depict buers of 5, 10, and 15 kilometers (for ease of viewing)
around bank branches, generated using a process called buer analysis. Buer analysis is a spatial
analysis technique that generates circles of specied radii around points of interest (such as mobile
money agents) and then calculates the number of other features of interest (such as the number
of other agents and population counts) that fall within these circles. By combining the surveyed
agent locations with the spatial demographic data, we generate control variables PopK1km and
PovRatio1km through buer analysis.
5.4. Econometric specication
Dependent variable From the survey data, we have point estimates of the steady-state number
of successful transactions on a busy day (T), the number of transactions denied due to stockouts
(S), and the number of transactions denied due to system failure (F). We dene demand as D =
T + S + F. We conduct an OLS regression on the natural logarithm of demand (log(Demand)).Balasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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Figure 3 Spatial poor population and bank buers in Kenya's Nyanza Province, adapted from BMGF (2012)
We log demand for two principle reasons. First, demand cannot be negative in this context (to be
licensed, all agents must have at least 1 transaction per day). Secondly, using the log of demand
simplies the interpretation of estimated coecients: a 1 unit change in an independent variable
corresponds to a *100% change in demand.
Independent and interaction variables Our independent variables are listed as follows.
StockoutRatio, the ratio of transactions denied due to stockouts to total demand is calculated as
S=D.3 SystemDownRatio, the ratio of transaction denied due to system failures to total demand
is calculated as F=D. DirectCompetition, our measure for competitive intensity, indicates the
number of other agents primarily serving the same operator as a particular agent within 1 kilome-
ter of that agent. PricingTransparency is an indicator variable that captures whether an agent
has posted the tari sheet (listing of transaction prices) prominently in the shop, with a 1 indi-
cating that the agent posted the tari sheet and a 0 indicating that the agent did not post the
tari sheet prominently in the shop. Expertise is an indicator variable that captures whether the
agent correctly answered a dicult question about mobile money policy, with a 1 indicating that
the agent correctly responded to the question (greater expertise), and a 0 indicating that they
3 There is a structural positive relationship between StockoutRatio and log(Demand) as they are dene here. For
example, if we increase StockoutRatio, log(Demand) structurally increases, all else equal. As will become apparent
in the next section, we hypothesize a negative relationship between StockoutRatio and log(Demand). Therefore,
relatively to our hypotheses, this structure is conservative. For such a hypothesis to be supported, an increase in
StokcoutRatio must decrease log(Demand) suciently to overcome this structural positive relationship.Balasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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did not respond correctly to the question (lesser expertise). To estimate the impact of competi-
tion on service quality, we include interactions between DirectCompetition and StockoutRatio,
PricingTransparency, and Expertise.
Control variables We include several controls that are likely to impact demand. Male indicates
agent gender, with a 1 indicating male and a 0 indicating female. Dedicated indicates whether
the agent is solely dedicated to the mobile money business or whether they operate another retail
business on the side, with a 1 indicating dedication to solely mobile money transactions and a 0
indicating that the agent operates other businesses in parallel. Sunday indicates whether the agent
is open for business on Sunday, with a 1 indicating that the agent operates on Sunday and a 0 if
the agent does not operate on Sunday. Tills is a variable that takes integer values greater than
0 to indicate the number of agent tills (i.e., \virtual cash registers") the agent has. TillsRoot is
the square root of the number of tills, and is included to capture potential diminishing returns
gained from each incremental till. PopK1km and PovRatio1km are the population (in thousands)
within a 1 kilometer radius of an agent and the ratio of those people who live on less than $2 a
day, respectively. IndirectCompetition is the number of agents primarily serving other operators
in a 1 kilometer radius of an agent. Bank1km is the number of bank branches in a 1 kilometer
radius of an agent; banks are a major resource in helping agents rebalance inventory (get cash
and/or e-oat). Bus1km is the number of major bus stops in a 1 kilometer radius of an agent;
this is a proxy for the diculty of transit in the vicinity of the agent. NumUsersM is a measure
of the number of users (in millions) that subscribe to the operator network that an agent serves.
CountryAge is a measure of market maturity: it measures the number of months between when
the rst mobile money service launched in a particular country and June 2013 (when the survey
was conducted). Finally, there are 5 (+1) indicator variables for each operator/brand represented
in the sample, which capture dierences across operators not accounted for by our independent
variables or the controls above.
6. Results
Summary statistics are presented in the appendix. Table A1 includes means, standard deviations,
and dierences in means. Table A2 presents pair-wise correlation statistics. Generally speaking,
Kenya leads Uganda in mobile money market development. The average agent across the sample
faces a demand for approximately 56 transactions on a busy day, and we note that Kenya leads
on this metric. We also note that the StockoutRatio in Kenya is lower than in Uganda, perhaps
suggesting that as a market matures, agents stock out less frequently. This pattern is even more
pronounced with SystemDownRatio: Ugandan agents lose twice as much demand to platform
failures than their Kenyan counterparts. Overall, 26% of the consumer transactions demandedBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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were denied, resulting in an average service level of less than 74%. Kenya leads with an average
81% service level versus the Ugandan average of 67%. With regard to PricingTransparency, the
vast majority of agents are transparent with pricing, led by Kenya. With regard to Expertise,
approximately 81% of agents passed an expertise test, with Kenya lagging slightly. Competition
among agents, as measured by the number of other agents that directly compete with each agent,
is lower in Uganda than in Kenya. This is reversed for the number of indirectly competing agents
(agents serving other operators), where the average Ugandan agent has more indirectly competing
agents within 1 kilometer on average than their Kenyan counterparts.
The sample contained slightly more female agents than male agents, approximately equal in
both countries. Additionally, just under half of the sampled agents operated on Sunday, with
Ugandan agents more likely to operate on Sunday than Kenyan agents. Just over half of agents
run a dedicated mobile money business. The average Kenyan agent serves an operator that is used
by many more people (50% larger) than the average Ugandan agent's operator. Another proxy for
market development is CountryAge, which is the number of months between when the rst mobile
money operator in the country launched and June 2013; Kenya began more than 2 years ahead
of Uganda. We also note that even in Kenya, the market is relatively young{Safaricom, the global
leader of mobile payment providers, launched less than 7 years ago. We also note that Kenyan
agents in the sample locate on average in more densely populated areas than Ugandan agents,
while Ugandan agents are much more likely to be located in areas of high poverty concentration
than Kenyan agents. Finally, we see that Kenyan agents in the sample on average have at least
twice as many bank branches and bus-stands within a 1 kilometer radius than Ugandan agents.
This is reective of the fact that Kenya is more economically developed than Uganda, and thus its
nancial and transportation infrastructure is more developed than its neighbor.
The results from ve OLS regressions are presented in Table A3. The rst model excludes
interactions with DirectCompetition. The next three models each include a single interaction term,
and the nal model includes all three interaction terms.4 The discussion that follows is based on
the full model unless otherwise noted. Robust standard errors are reported, as the Breusch-Pagan
test indicated the presence of heteroskedasticity.
To test whether the results presented in Table A3 are robust to the inclusion of dropped obser-
vations, we utilize multiple imputation (predictive mean matching) to predict missing values. We
then estimate log(demand) using the full set of 4,406 survey observations. Results for this test are
presented in Table A4 in the Appendix. While estimated coecient values vary slightly relative to
the base models, the results presented above hold (both directionally and in signicance).
4 Models 2 through 4 are provided so that estimated coecients for the interaction terms in the full model can be
compared to those in the models that isolate a single interaction to ensure that results in the full model are not
skewed by potential multi-colinearity (given that all three interaction terms include competitive intensity).Balasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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6.1. Service reliability
Our rst set of hypotheses focused on the eect of service reliability through its inverse, denied
transactions from stockouts and from system failures. From Table A3, we note that the coecient on
StockoutRatio is large, negative, and statistically signicant, in both model 1 (without interaction
terms) and model 5 (with interaction terms). Using the result from model 5, the coecient on
StockoutRatio can be interpreted as follows: for an agent with zero direct competitors in her 1
kilometer catchment area, a 0.1 increase in StockoutRatio (equivalently, a 10 percentage point
increase in stockout percentage) results in a estimated 5.55% drop in steady-state demand. Figure
4 depicts a plot of predicted values (with 95% condence intervals) and estimates of log(Demand)
over the range of StockoutRatio values.5
Figure 4 Plot of stockout eect on demand
The SystemDownRatio coecient is much smaller in magnitude than StockoutRatio, and is
not statistically signicant. We test whether SystemDownRatio is equal to StockoutRatio. The
F-statistic for this test (the square of the t-statistic) is 8.83, which results in rejecting the null
(p < 0:01) hypothesis that the two coecients are equal, supporting hypothesis 1b. These results
suggest that customers react more negatively to denied transactions due to stockouts than they do
for denied transactions due to system failure.
5 These estimated values are generated by using model 5 to generate a predicted value of log(Demand) for each
observation by plugging in true values of all right-hand side variables except for StockoutRatio (using the value of
interest) and then averaging these predicted values of log(Demand).Balasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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6.2. Pricing transparency and agent expertise
We next test the eect of service quality measures on demand: pricing transparency and expertise.
The data support hypothesis 2a. The main eect of pricing transparency (non-transparency) is an
increase (decrease) in the agent's steady-state demand. The data also support hypothesis 2b. As
a main eect, agent expertise increases steady-state demand. The magnitudes of these eects are
also notable; the presence of a tari sheet increases demand by over 12% and the ability to answer
a dicult question about mobile money policy increases demand by over 10%.
6.3. Competition
The data support hypothesis 3a, competitive intensity attenuates steady-state demand. Figure
5 depicts the estimated values (with 95% condence intervals) of log(Demand) as the level of
competitive intensity varies.
Figure 5 Plot of competitive intensity eect on demand
Our nal three hypotheses relate to how competitive intensity interacts with dimensions of
service quality: stockouts (i.e., service failure), pricing transparency, and expertise. The coe-
cient on DirectCompetition x StockoutRatio is signicant and negative, which supports hypoth-
esis 3b: proximate competition signicantly exacerbates the stockout eect. The coecient on
DirectCompetition x PricingTransparency is not statistically signicant. Hypothesis 3c is there-
fore not supported: we do not nd that competitive intensity augments the pricing transparency
eect. Finally, the coecient on DirectCompetition x Expertise is signicant and positive, sup-
porting hypothesis 3d: competitive intensity augments the expertise eect. These latter two eects
are illustrated in Figures 6a and 6b. In Figure 6a, we see the estimated log(Demand) values asBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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PricingTransparency and DirectCompetition are varied. The pricing transparency eect, the
gap between the two lines, is clearly visible, but there is not a dierence in the slopes of the two
lines (which would be evidence of an interaction between competitive intensity and pricing trans-
parency). Figure 6b illustrates estimates of logDemand as DirectCompetition and Expertise are
varied. Analogously to the pricing transparency eect, we clearly see the expertise eect in the
gap between the two lines. However in Figure 6b a dierence in the slopes of the two lines is also
visible, evidence of an interaction between competitive intensity and expertise.
(a) Pricing transparency eects (b) Expertise eects
Figure 6 Plots of predicted demand as a function of competitive intensity and service quality measures
7. Discussion
Our results provide insight on how service quality and competition aect demand in a new and
important operations context, particularly relevant to the base of the pyramid community. Speci-
cally, we investigate the eect of stockouts, pricing transparency, and mobile money agents' exper-
tise. We also investigate the eect of competitive intensity on demand, both directly and as a
moderator of service quality eects. Furthermore, we empirically demonstrate the notion that,
beyond the potential immediate lost sale, there is a long-term cost to stockouts in the form of lost
steady-state demand. We also see a reward (cost) for pricing transparency (non-transparency) and
expertise (lack of expertise). The cost associated with stockouts and the rewards associated with
expertise are magnied in the face of competition.
This paper provides empirical support to Schwartz's (1966) theoretical prediction that stockouts
would alter future demand. As Anderson et al. (2006) showed was the case with mail-order catalogs,
we nd that mobile money agents in Kenya and Uganda who stock out more often experience lower
steady-state demand. We nd that for the average agent, a 1% increase in stockouts (0.01 increaseBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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in StockoutRatio) corresponds to a reduction in demand of approximately 0.85%. The fact that
the stockout eect is large is not surprising, given the potential urgency associated with the service.
For example, Jack and Suri (2014) show that mobile money had the eect of signicantly widening
and enhancing informal insurance networks, enabling family and friends to send users more money
more eciently in times of crisis (Jack and Suri 2014).
We also demonstrate that the magnitude of the stockout eect is augmented in the face of
competitive intensity. Figure 7 illustrates this nding. While an agent who faces no competition
loses approximately 0.55% of demand for a 1% increase in stockouts, an agent who faces 170
agents (roughly the 75th percentile) incurs a 0.95% reduction in demand for every 1% increase in
stockouts. In this case, greater competitive intensity nearly doubles the stockout eect.
Figure 7 Plot of marginal eect of StockoutRatio (SOR) on demand as a function of Competitive Intensity
Furthermore, we demonstrate the stockout eect is larger than the system-down eect; agents
lose more demand for stocking out than for system failures, even though the net result is the same{
a denied transaction. This result is roughly in line with Taylor (1994), who nds that attribution
of blame for airline delays is associated with the degree to which customers believe the airline
had control over the delay. Our result takes this nding a step further: customers do not decrease
their demand for an agent's services in response to an operator's failure. To the extent that this
generalizes to other contexts, this result has managerial implications to rms with franchised or
otherwise contracted operations. When the franchisee/contractor/reseller can successfully demon-
strate to customers that a service failure was not the result of her own failure, but rather the failureBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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of a supplier/provider, then some, if not all of the demand reduction associated with service failure
might be avoided.
Agents will also want to account for lost steady-state demand as a consequence of stockouts
when deciding on their cash and e-oat inventory levels. Determining agents' optimal inventory
policy given operator commission rates and this loss of future sales due to stockouts is the focus
of future work.
This paper adds empirical support to the notions that customers reward both pricing trans-
parency and expertise. In the mobile money context, agents enjoy signicant rewards for both
pricing transparency and expertise as a main eect. We also add empirical evidence to the intuitive
notion that competitive intensity dampens rm demand. Oliveras and Cachon (2009) termed this
the \sales eect," but we refer to it as the \competition eect" to make it clear that compet-
itive intensity is the driver because many of our independent and control variables aect sales.
We nd that a competition eect is indeed present in the mobile money context. Perhaps more
interesting is our nding that this eect is greatly augmented when competitive intensity is inter-
acted with stockout ratio. Based on the coecient for DirectCompetition and its interaction with
StockoutRatio (table A3), for an agent that has a stockout ratio of 0.1 (10% of total demand is
not satised due to stockout), the competition eect is augmented by over 50%. Agents that deny
15% of their demand due to stockouts will face a competitive eect augmented by over 80%. We
also nd that expertise interacts with competition: the rewards for expertise increase in the face
of greater competitive intensity. However, our data suggest that pricing transparency does not
interact with competitive intensity. This suggests that pricing transparency is not a dimension of
competition in mobile money, only that some fraction of the (potential) customer base simply will
not do business with non-transparent agents, whether or not there are other competitors around.
Using the operations strategy terminology coined by Hill (1993), pricing transparency may be an
\order qualier" for a segment of the market|these customers will not even consider agents who
are not transparent with prices. Our data suggest that both reliability and expertise act as \order
winners" for a segment of customers|all else equal, these customers choose more reliable and more
expert agents among their set of \qualied" agents.
For mobile money agents, this model allows for the calculation of the approximate long-term
cost of service level decisions: the loss of demand to be expected for a given service level. This value
(along with additional parameters) can be used to generate an agent's optimal inventory control
policy. In informal interviews, agents in Kenya indicated that they were generally concerned by
proximate agents serving the same operator, especially when the interviewed agent had experienced
recent stockout service failures. By demonstrating competition's eect on demand, as well as anBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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interaction between competition and stockouts, this paper provides empirical support to these
agents' intuition.
For mobile money operators, this work has several implications. First, it can be useful in planning
agent network expansion, as it yields a prediction of demand a potential agent may face if she began
operating in a particular location. Similarly, our empirical model can inform the optimal placement
and number of agents in a certain geography|enough to capture demand (and potentially to inspire
higher service levels), but not so many to jeopardize agents' commercial viability. Understanding
the stockout eect (and its moderators) is useful in this process. It also informs guidance and/or
policies operators should put in place, such as mandatory and rigorously enforced tari sheet
posting and rigorous training to ensure knowledge of policies.
This analysis, like other analyses using survey data, suers from potential bias: demand, stockout,
and system failure data were all self-reported estimates by the agent. To the extent that agents
thought their operators might see the results (even though they were promised condentiality by
the third party research rm, and this condentiality was honored), agents' estimates of stockouts
might be biased downwards. However, there is no evidence to indicate that some agents might
be more biased than others. There is also a limitation in regards to our spatial variables. First,
the catchment areas are dened in terms of \as-the-crow-ies" distance, rather than true travel
time. Secondly, the service quality of nearby competing agents very likely aects the impact of a
particular agent's service quality on their steady-state demand. Unfortunately, our dataset does
not capture a quality metric such as the one that may have proven useful in this case. Finally, our
dataset limited our measure of demand to a raw count of transactions. An interesting additional
dimension of analysis would consider the value of these transactions as well.
8. Conclusions
Mobile money is a rapidly growing industry that has potential to dramatically improve the lives
of the poor in a multitude of ways, including through facilitating more ecient cash transfers
after emergencies. We begin to explore this industry by characterizing the demand faced by mobile
money agents, as well as determining factors that drive (or dampen) demand for cash-in and cash-
out transactions. We nd that an agent's reduction in demand associated with stocking out of
cash or e-oat is economically and statistically signicant. However, agents do not experience a
demand reduction when they are unable to fulll demand due to a system outage. Mobile money
consumers, therefore, appear to dierentially ascribe transaction failure ownership. Agents who
are transparent with transaction pricing experience relatively greater demand. Agents who are
relatively more knowledgeable not only see relatively greater demand, but also seem to reap benets
from this expertise in the face of competition. Finally, we nd that the demand reduction associatedBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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with stockouts is exacerbated by the presence of competitors, indicating that agents' inventory
management (as experienced through stockout rate) is another important competitive dimension
in this context.
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APPENDIX
Overall Kenya Uganda Dierence
logDemand 4.03 4.05 4.00 0.05**
[0.65] [0.69] [0.59]
StockoutRatio 0.07 0.06 0.07 -0.01**
[0.07] [0.06] [0.07]
SystemDownRatio 0.19 0.13 0.26 -0.13**
[0.13] [0.10] [0.13]
PricingTransparency 0.92 0.96 0.88 0.08**
[0.26] [0.20] [0.32]
Expertise 0.81 0.78 0.84 -0.06**
[0.39] [0.41] [0.37]
DirectCompetition 135.51 144.74 124.26 20.48**
[177.37] [171.56] [183.64]
Male 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.00
[0.50] [0.50] [0.50]
CountryAge 64.73 76.00 51.00 25.00**
[12.44] [0.00] [0.00]
NumUsersMM 10.84 13.51 7.59 5.92**
[5.28] [4.52] [4.22]
Sunday 0.47 0.44 0.50 -0.06**
[0.50] [0.50] [0.50]
Dedicated 0.43 0.42 0.44 -0.02+
[0.50] [0.49] [0.50]
Tills 1.12 1.04 1.21 -0.17**
[0.59] [0.34] [0.78]
TillsRoot 1.04 1.01 1.08 -0.07**
[0.18] [0.11] [0.24]
IndirectCompetition 70.00 62.24 79.45 -17.21**
[182.67] [219.25] [123.76]
PopK1km 27.04 31.58 21.50 10.08**
[34.00] [41.53] [20.21]
PovRatio1km 0.19 0.08 0.34 -0.26**
[0.18] [0.10] [0.15]
Bank1km 7.85 10.28 4.89 5.39**
[15.92] [19.80] [8.29]
Bus1km 4.18 6.59 1.25 5.34**
[15.05] [19.89] [2.16]
Table A1 Summary statistics: means, standard deviations (in brackets), and dierences in meansBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
StockoutRatio (SOR) -0.825 -0.541 -0.827 -0.818 -0.555
(0.150) (0.186) (0.150) (0.150) (0.186)
SystemDownRatio 0.0635 0.0574 0.0630 0.0580 0.0525
(0.0884) (0.0886) (0.0884) (0.0885) (0.0887)
PricingTransparency (PT) 0.136 0.137 0.118 0.139 0.122
(0.0367) (0.0366) (0.0454) (0.0367) (0.0450)
Expertise (E) 0.143 0.141 0.144 0.103 0.106
(0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0310) (0.0311)
DirectCompetition -0.000263 -0.0000968 -0.000407 -0.000499 -0.000455
(0.0000593) (0.0000847) (0.000185) (0.000120) (0.000214)
SOR x DirectCompetition -0.00264 -0.00246
(0.000859) (0.000862)
PT x DirectCompetition 0.000154 0.000151
(0.000188) (0.000182)
E x DirectCompetition 0.000288 0.000252
(0.000124) (0.000123)
Male 0.0882 0.0883 0.0879 0.0888 0.0886
(0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0186)
CountryAge -0.0708 -0.0709 -0.0708 -0.0711 -0.0711
(0.0289) (0.0287) (0.0290) (0.0285) (0.0284)
NumUsersMM 0.398+ 0.399+ 0.398+ 0.399+ 0.400+
(0.227) (0.225) (0.227) (0.223) (0.223)
Sunday 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144
(0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185)
Dedicated 0.0565 0.0572 0.0561 0.0577 0.0578
(0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182)
Tills -0.371 -0.367 -0.372 -0.372 -0.370
(0.0908) (0.0907) (0.0908) (0.0921) (0.0918)
TillsRoot 1.674 1.658 1.678 1.680 1.669
(0.287) (0.286) (0.287) (0.289) (0.289)
IndirectCompetition 0.000123 0.000159+ 0.000124 0.000124 0.000160+
(0.0000924) (0.0000934) (0.0000925) (0.0000928) (0.0000939)
PopK1km 0.000954 0.000921 0.000956 0.000988 0.000957
(0.000291) (0.000291) (0.000291) (0.000291) (0.000292)
PovRatio1km -0.0923 -0.0874 -0.0920 -0.0890 -0.0846
(0.0857) (0.0857) (0.0858) (0.0858) (0.0858)
Bank1km 0.00777 0.00758 0.00778 0.00765 0.00749
(0.00126) (0.00126) (0.00126) (0.00126) (0.00127)
Bus1km -0.00614 -0.00645 -0.00619 -0.00603 -0.00638
(0.00137) (0.00137) (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00138)
cons 5.395 5.387 5.405 5.434 5.431
(1.338) (1.328) (1.342) (1.320) (1.317)
N 3580 3580 3580 3580 3580
adj. R2 0.294 0.295 0.294 0.295 0.296
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p< 0:10,
 p< 0:05,
 p< 0:01
Table A3 OLS regression results with robust standard errors in parenthesesBalasubramanian and Drake: Service Quality, Competition, and Mobile Money Agent Demand
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
StockoutRatio (SOR) -0.760 -0.470 -0.762 -0.752 -0.486
(0.133) (0.167) (0.133) (0.133) (0.167)
SystemDownRatio -0.0426 -0.0445 -0.0432 -0.0483 -0.0499
(0.0829) (0.0830) (0.0829) (0.0829) (0.0830)
PricingTransparency (PT) 0.191 0.192 0.170 0.193 0.175
(0.0324) (0.0323) (0.0405) (0.0323) (0.0401)
Expertise (E) 0.154 0.152 0.154 0.106 0.110
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0293) (0.0293)
DirectCompetition -0.000202 -0.0000309 -0.000373 -0.000491 -0.000457
(0.0000560) (0.0000780) (0.000180) (0.000120) (0.000206)
SOR x DirectCompetition -0.00279 -0.00259
(0.000836) (0.000839)
PT x DirectCompetition 0.000182 0.000170
(0.000183) (0.000176)
E x DirectCompetition 0.000351 0.000310
(0.000125) (0.000124)
Male 0.0831 0.0832 0.0829 0.0836 0.0834
(0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170)
CountryAge -0.0757 -0.0752 -0.0756 -0.0760 -0.0755
(0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0226) (0.0223) (0.0222)
NumUsersMM 0.431 0.428 0.431 0.433 0.429
(0.176) (0.175) (0.177) (0.174) (0.174)
Sunday 0.155 0.155 0.154 0.155 0.155
(0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0173)
Dedicated 0.0708 0.0712 0.0706 0.0719 0.0719
(0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166)
Tills -0.380 -0.376 -0.381 -0.380 -0.377
(0.0794) (0.0793) (0.0794) (0.0805) (0.0803)
TillsRoot 1.716 1.698 1.721 1.718 1.705
(0.251) (0.250) (0.251) (0.253) (0.253)
IndirectCompetition 0.000170 0.000202 0.000172 0.000171 0.000201
(0.0000828) (0.0000833) (0.0000830) (0.0000835) (0.0000841)
PopK1km 0.000780 0.000765 0.000787 0.000830 0.000818
(0.000271) (0.000271) (0.000271) (0.000271) (0.000272)
PovRatio1km -0.142+ -0.138+ -0.141+ -0.136+ -0.133+
(0.0758) (0.0758) (0.0758) (0.0758) (0.0758)
Bank1km 0.00730 0.00714 0.00732 0.00719 0.00707
(0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00113)
Bus1km -0.00698 -0.00726 -0.00703 -0.00687 -0.00718
(0.00124) (0.00124) (0.00124) (0.00125) (0.00125)
cons 5.515 5.481 5.525 5.567 5.538
(1.050) (1.044) (1.055) (1.042) (1.041)
N 4406 4406 4406 4406 4406
adj. R2 0.327 0.328 0.327 0.329 0.329
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p< 0:10,
 p< 0:05,
 p< 0:01
Table A4 OLS regression results, using multiple imputation for missing data, with robust standard errors in
parentheses